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This paper summarizes the potential contributions of the new institutional 
economics to agricultural policy research, with particular emphasis to developing 
countries.  The paper starts by providing an overview of the new institutional 
economics and its several branches of thought.  It then describes the future 
challenges facing world agriculture and shows the potential applications of new 
institutional and transaction costs economics to agricultural policy analysis in this 
new world environment.  The paper concludes by providing specific examples of 
interest in the area of agricultural market research in developing countries that 
can be analyzed using the new institutional economics.  As a dynamic and 
relatively new school of thought, the new institutional economics offers exciting 
opportunities to answer some of the economic problems that neo-classical 










 “New institutional economists are the blue-collar guys with a hearty appetite for 
reality.” 
Oliver Williamson, 2000a 
   
1.  An Overview of the New Institutional Economics 
 
The New Institutional Economics is a vast and relatively new multidisciplinary 
field that includes aspects of economics, history, sociology, political science, 
business organization and law. Oliver Williamson coined the phrase the “New 
Institutional Economics” (Coase, 2000) but it is commonly known that the New 
Institutional Economics emerged with Coase’s 1937 article “The Nature of the 
Firm”. This article and his other famous essay “The Problem of Social Cost” 
(1960) started what many, including North (2000), considered to be a revolution 
in economics. This new direction of economics considers that the cost of 
transacting – determined by institutions and institutional arrangements – is the 
key to economic performance. It is therefore argued that the institutions of a 
country – such as its legal, political, and social systems – determine its economic 
performance, and it is this, according to Coase (2000), that gives the new 
institutional economics its importance for economists. 





Williamson coined the phrase “New Institutional Economics (NIE)” to distinguish 
it from the “old institutional economics” pioneered by Commons and Veblen. The 
old institutional school argued that institutions were a key factor in explaining and 
influencing economic behavior, but there was little analytical rigor and no 
theoretical framework in this school of thought. It operated outside neo-classical 
economics and there was no quantitative theory from which reliable 
generalization could be derived or sound policy choices made. Neo-classical 
economics, on the other hand, ignored the role of institutions; economic agents 
were assumed to operate almost in a vacuum.  
 
The NIE acknowledges the important role of institutions, but argues that one can 
analyze institutions within the framework of neoclassical economics. In other 
words, under NIE, some of the unrealistic assumptions of neo-classical 
economics (such as perfect information, zero transaction costs, full rationality) 
are relaxed, but the assumption of self-seeking individuals attempting to 
maximize an objective function subject to constraints still holds. Furthermore, 
institutions are incorporated as an additional constraint under the NIE framework. 
As Langlois (1986, p.5) puts it, “the problem with many of the early 
institutionalists is that they wanted an economics with institutions but without 





without institutions; what the New Institutional Economics tries to do is provide an 
economics with both theory and institutions.” 
  
The purpose of the NIE is both to explain the determinants of institutions and 
their evolution over time, and to evaluate their impact on economic performance, 
efficiency, and distribution (Nabli and Nugent, 1989). There is also a sort of two-
way causality between institutions and economic growth. On the one hand, 
institutions have a profound influence on economic growth, and on the other 
hand, economic growth and development often result in a change in institutions. 
In the second theme, for example, growth in international trade and globalization 
trigger the need to develop official and internationally recognized grades and 
standards. However, not all institutional changes are beneficial. In fact, by 
influencing transaction costs and co-ordination possibilities, institutions can have 
the effect of either facilitating or retarding economic growth. That explains for 
example why we have various institutions that develop in different countries and 
why we have different paths of economic development.  
 
1.1  Institutions defined 
 
The most commonly agreed upon definition for institutions is: a set of formal 





rules of conduct (norms, traditions, customs, value systems, religions, 
sociological trends, etc.) that facilitate coordination or govern relationships 
between individuals or groups.  Institutions provide for more certainty in human 
interaction (North, 1990). Institutions have an influence on our behavior and 
therefore on outcomes such as economic performance, efficiency, economic 
growth and development.  
 
It is important to note that the NIE operates at two levels  – macro and micro 
(Williamson, 2000b). The macro level deals with the institutional environment, or 
the rules of the game, which affect the behavior and performance of economic 
actors and in which organizational forms and transactions are embedded. 
Williamson (1993) describes it as the set of fundamental political, social, and 
legal ground rules that establish the basis for production, exchange and 
distribution. The micro level analysis, on the other hand, also known as the 
institutional arrangement, deals with the institutions of governance. These, 
according to Williamson, refer more to the modes of managing transactions and 
include market, quasi- market, and hierarchical modes of contracting. The focus 
here is on the individual transaction and questions regarding organizational forms 
(vertical integration versus out- contracting) are analyzed. An institutional 
arrangement is basically an arrangement between economic units that governs 





the institutional arrangement is probably the closest counterpart of the most 
popular use of the term ‘institution’. 
 
It is also useful to distinguish institutions from organizations. Organizations can 
be defined as a structure of roles. Many institutions are organizations; for 
instance, households, firms and co-operatives. Other types of institutions, on the 
other hand, are not organizations, such as money or the law. Likewise, there are 
organizations (for example grass-root organizations) that are not institutions. 
 
1.2  “Branches” of the New Institutional Economics 
 
The literature provides a wide variety of definitions of the NIE illustrating the 
difficulty of defining this field. In this section we accept the analogy of Olson and 
Kähkönen (2000) but use some ideas from other authors to show the different 
branches contained under this new paradigm. 
 
Olson and Kähkönen (2000) compare modern economics with large metropolitan 
areas with the “suburbs” expanding rapidly in all directions – into politics, law, 
sociology, etc. It is the use of economic-type methods in politics where 
economists and political scientists have created the growing field of collective 





economics led to the major field of “law and economics”. Economists’ ideas and 
methods also found their way into sociology, demography and into studies of the 
family and crime. Whereas economists traditionally studied prices, quantities and 
fluctuations, they now also study the governance structures and dispute-
resolution mechanisms of societies. It is to these studies that the label “New 
Institutional Economics” is attached, but according to Olson and Kähkönen 
(2000) it sometimes also refers to the expansion or “suburbanization” of 
economics as a whole. The influence in other social sciences of the deductive 
methods of economists has been so far reaching that there is, in some sense, a 
theoretical integration of the social sciences under one overarching paradigm. 
Whether this new paradigm will be the new institutional economics, remains to be 
seen.  
     
As a result of the expansion of economics into other social sciences, primarily 
law, politics and sociology, NIE is by definition a multidisciplinary field of study 
comprising several branches. As mentioned earlier, there is still some debate as 
to what falls under the NIE banner but there seems to be some agreement that 
the study fields listed here are part of the NIE. Fields such as the so-called “new 
economic history” and the public choice school inform the institutional 
environment at the macro level while transaction cost economics and information 





and the forms of governance. The following paragraphs give a very brief 
summary of each field. Figure 1 gives a graphical depiction of these fields and 
the main academic contributors to each. 
 





New Economic History 
 
North pioneered the New Economic History in an attempt to explain how 
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aspect of the NIE, which looks at the role of institutional change in fostering 
overall economic growth and explaining the divergence in the development of 
various countries. According to North, institutions (he equates institutions to the 
institutional environment, i.e. the set of political, social and legal ground rules) 
that evolve to lower transaction costs are the key to the performance of 
economies (North, 1990). For North, path dependency and history are important 
in explaining institutional development. North posits that not all institutions are 
efficient and that inefficient institutions can persist for a long time thereby 
hindering growth. Institutions can be captured by powerful groups to serve their 
particular interests. Witness for example the institution of the mafia that started in 
the early parts of the 20
th century. 
 
According to North, two important catalysts for institutional change are changes 
in relative prices and technological innovations. In response to these changes, 
one or both parties in a transaction may find it more efficient to change the rules 
of their agreement or contract, thereby introducing a new institutional 
arrangement benefiting one or both parties. Historically, population change is 
seen as the most important source of relative price change. More recently, 
technological change and changes in the costs of information are becoming 
major sources of institutional change and changes in relative prices.  





Public Choice and Political Economy 
 
This branch of NIE is illustrated in the early work by Buchanan and Tullock 
(1962) on the economic analysis of political systems and political decision-
making. Bates (1981) and Olson (1971) have also analyzed rent-seeking 
behavior and interest groups dynamics to explain why some economic outcomes 
are less than economically efficient. In particular, Bates (1971) and Lipton (1977) 
explain the bias against the agricultural sector in developing countries as a result 
of a more politically active urban constituency demanding cheap food policies. 
Under Olson’s hypothesis, farmers’ groups in developing countries would be too 
large, dispersed, and heterogenous, and therefore less able to influence policy, 
than better organized and smaller urban consumer groups. 
  
New Social Economics 
 
The work of Becker on intra-household analysis, family economics, and human 
capital was a major breakthrough in explaining choices that were made outside 
the market and that were previously not addressed by neo-classical economics. 
Robert Putnam’s (1993) work on social capital also falls within this framework, 
but social capital is also incorporated in transaction cost economics as an 





Social capital refers to social connections or networks, norms and trust, all of 
which can facilitate cooperation in society and ultimately have effects on 
economic performance (Putnam, 1993; Ensminger 2000).  It is now increasingly 
being recognized that social connections and networks should be studied to 
explain economic behavior and organization.  
 
Theory of Collective Action  
 
The theory of collective action includes work by Olson on collective action 
through interest groups. It is a useful tool to analyze how to overcome the free-
rider problem and come up with cooperative solutions for the management of 
common resources or the provision of public goods.  According to Olson (1971), 
important determinants of success in collective action include the size, 
homogeneity and purpose of the group.  
 
An important field of investigation in the theory and application of collective action 
concerns the use of “common-pool  resources” such as water, land, fisheries, 
forests, etc. In the past, the solution to the so-called “tragedy of the commons” 
was the establishment of enforceable property rights over the resources. 
However, recent work by Ostrom and others have shown that local institutional 





cooperative solutions can overcome the collective action difficulties and help 
achieve efficiency in the use of such resources (Nabli and Nugent, 1989). 
 
Law and Economics 
 
The application of economic analysis to the study of laws and regulations has led 
to an important field termed “law and economics.”  The most famous contributor 
to the law and economics literature is Posner (1971, 1974, 1984, 1998). Posner 
studied regulations, litigations, and legal decisions, using a theoretical economic 
approach.  Players in the legal system are viewed as rational actors who attempt 
to maximize their returns from legal action and regulations.    
 
Transaction cost economics  
  
The general hypothesis of this strand of the NIE is that institutions are transaction 
cost-minimizing arrangements, which may change and evolve with changes in 
the nature and sources of transaction costs. This work was pioneered by Coase 
in his 1937 article “The Nature of the Firm” where he argues that market 
exchange is not costless. Coase underlines the important role of transaction 
costs in the organization of firms and other contracts.  Transaction costs include 





of contracts.  He explains that firms emerge to economize on the transaction 
costs of market exchange and that the “boundary” of a firm or the extent of 
vertical integration will depend on the magnitude of these transaction costs.   
 
The work of Williamson on the economics of organization and contracts follows 
Coase’s line of thinking. Williamson has combined the concepts of bounded 
rationality and opportunistic behavior (which manifests itself as adverse 
selection, moral hazard, cheating, shirking, and other forms of strategic behavior) 
to explain contractual choice and the ownership structure of firms. In 
Williamson’s framework, a trade-off has to be made between the costs of 
coordination and hierarchy within an organization, and the costs of transacting 
and forming contracts in the market. This trade-off will depend on the magnitude 
of transaction costs. 
 
The focus here is thus on the costs of doing business. At the heart of this is the 
making, monitoring and enforcing of contracts. The ease or difficulty of 
contracting, and the types of contract made are determined by the level and 
nature of transaction costs which are influenced by the extent of imperfect 
information involved in making a transaction. Central to transaction costs 
economics is the costliness of information, discussed in the next section. 





institutional factors and market and non-market exchange under positive 
transaction costs. 
 
Economics of information 
 
As indicated earlier the transaction cost economics school and the literature on 
the economics of information is not mutually exclusive and to a large extent 
intertwined. The economics of information literature includes the seminal papers 
by Akerlof (1970), Stigler (1961, 1967), and Stiglitz (1981, 1985, 1986 (with 
Greenwald), 1993 (with Arnott and Greenwald)).  Stigler’s main point is that 
searching for market information is not costless and that may explain why we 
may have a divergence of prices between efficient markets and why capital 
markets are “imperfect”. The work by Akerlof on the market for lemons explains 
how quality guarantees, reputation, and trust are useful tools to ensure the 
production of quality goods and to project information about it.  Stiglitz also 
analyzed the role of imperfect information, adverse selection, and moral hazard, 
on the performance of credit and labor markets, and the behavior of the firm.  
 
The imperfect-information theory has been used to explain the emergence of key 
agrarian institutions which are seen as substitutes for missing credit or insurance 





transaction costs (Bhardan, 1989). This includes institutions such as 
sharecropping, interlocked contracts between labor, credit and land lease, etc. 
According to Bhardan (1989), under a set of informational constraints and 
missing markets, a given agrarian institution may be serving a real economic 
function. Therefore, abolishing this institution may not necessarily improve the 




The role of property rights is also accounted for in the NIE. According to Coase 
(1960), externalities can be internalized if property rights are well established. In 
Coase’s view, if property rights are well established and if there are no 
transaction costs, an externality can be internalized between two private parties 
through bargaining and negotiations. This is the essence of what has been 
labeled the “Coase Theorem.” Coase’s argument was used to counter Pigou’s 
call for government taxes to curb negative externalities. Coase showed that 
government involvement is in fact not necessary if property rights are well 
established. He also showed that the outcome would be efficient regardless of 
who owns the property right. The distribution aspects of the outcome, however, 





transaction costs, on the other hand, different systems of property rights may 
yield different outcomes in terms of efficiency. 
 
Property rights issues are also embedded in the incomplete contract theory 
pioneered by Grossman, Hart and Moore (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & 
Moore, 1990). The incomplete contracts economic theory of the firm combines 
the insights of transaction cost economics regarding the importance of bounded 
rationality and contracting costs with the rigor of agency theory. The new theory 
focuses on the way different organizational structures assign property rights to 
resolve the issues that arise when contracts are incomplete. This provides a 
basis for defining different organizational structures by the ownership and control 
of key assets.  
 
Incomplete contract theory predicts that asset ownership has an effect on parties’ 
incentives to invest. This effect is due to the impossibility to write comprehensive 
contingent contracts for relationship-specific investments and the resulting 
potential for opportunistic behaviour and ex post re-negotiation over the trade 
benefits. This risk of hold up leads to under-investments. Changing the allocation 
of asset ownership between the trading parties may solve (part of) the hold up 
problem. The second best ownership structure choice assigns most power to the 





2.  How can the New Institutional Economics framework be applied to 
agricultural policy research in developing countries? 
 
In order to start the debate on the relevance of the New Institutional Economics 
for agricultural policy research in developing countries it is appropriate to refer 
the following paragraph from North (2000): 
 
“The cost of transacting, to put it in it bluntest form, is the key to economic 
performance. When I go to third world countries and look at why they 
perform badly and examine how factor and product markets are really 
working, in every case, be it capital, labor or product markets, one observes 
that the cost of transacting is high. The cost of transacting results in the 
economy performing badly because it is so costly for human beings to 
interact and engage in various kinds of economic activity that the result is 
poor performance and poverty and so on. Where this takes us, of course, is 
to try to understand why the cost of transacting is so high,…” 
  
Since institutions and the institutional framework provide the incentives for 
efficient production and for people to engage in economic activity, an institutional 





countries. The frequent occurrence of market failure and incomplete markets 
(because of higher transaction costs and information asymmetries) in developing 
countries cannot be explained by conventional neo-classical economics and 
requires an institutional analysis. Many of the institutions or formal rules of 
behavior that are taken for granted in developed countries and that facilitate 
market exchange are absent in low-income countries. Therefore, the NIE is a 
useful framework that could help determine the types of institutions needed 
(either formal or informal) to improve economic performance in developing 
countries.  
 
The NIE framework has previously been used by a number of authors (see for 
example Binswanger and Rosensweig, 1986; Binswanger and McIntire, 1987; 
Stiglitz, 1974; Hayami and Otsuka, 1993) in applications to the problems of 
developing country agriculture. Dorward et. al. (1998) provide a detailed review 
of these applications. These studies are amongst a large body of literature that 
applies aspects of the NIE framework – mainly the cost of information and the 
lack of property rights – to explain market failures in the main intertemporal 
markets (insurance, credit, futures markets) and the labor market. Some authors 
also illustrate how institutions such as sharecropping and other forms of 
interlinked contracts emerge to overcome market failures.  





In addition to the many applications of the NIE framework to input market failures 
it can now also be argued that the rapid changes in the food and agricultural 
sector in developing countries in the aftermath of market liberalization and 
government devolution provides an additional and probably much more fertile 
terrain for the application of the NIE framework. This is illustrated in the next 
section. 
 
2.1  The challenges facing agriculture in developing countries 
 
The trend of market-oriented reforms following multilateral trade liberalization and 
especially structural adjustment programs in developing countries has led to the 
increased integration of world markets (Reardon and Barrett, 2000). This has 
meant that farmers in the developing world are now more than ever linked to 
consumers and corporations of the rich nations. Although most of the changes in 
agricultural and food markets are taking place in developed countries, they have 
far reaching implications for agricultural development efforts in developing 
countries.  
    
The increased industrialized nature of agriculture in developed as well as 
developing countries is largely the result of biological and information 





scale of organization and the modernization of production, processing and 
distribution systems (Sofranko et al, 2000). Drabenstott (1995:14) argues that 
there are two powerful forces driving this process of industrialization: a new 
consumer and a new producer. The new consumer is a highly demanding sort 
and the new producer is equipped with new technology and management tools 
that enable him to engineer food from farm to table. This sounds like an ideal 
situation, but traditional markets do not handle these circumstances well.  
 
The new lifestyles of consumers in the wealthy countries of the north, shifting 
demographics, as well as a growing appreciation for the link between diet and 
health, has contributed to different eating patterns and has influenced the food 
purchases of consumers in these countries. Consumers today are demanding 
much more than choice – they also want quality, consistency and value. Much of 
agriculture has therefore to shift from a philosophy of “here’s what we produce” to 
a situation where farmers take note of what the consumer wants. New 
technology now makes it possible to ensure that agricultural and food products 
do have the characteristics consumers want (Drabenstott, 1995; Boehlje 2000). 
This technology includes biotechnology and information technology.  
 
Added to this is the concern about food safety and the recent range of food 





food products, which include fresh meat, seafood, vegetables and fruits, and 
which account for half of the value of total food and agricultural exports from 
developing countries (Unnevehr, 2000). The need to control for high perishability 
and safe handling requires specialized production, packing techniques and 
refrigerated transport.  These require large capital investments and also involve 
investment in research, development, and marketing, which small and medium 
enterprises cannot easily afford.  
 
Apart from the pressures from consumers and end-use markets, other major 
drivers and contributors to these changes in agriculture include, increasing 
competition from global market participants, economies of size and scope in 
production and distribution, risk mitigation and management strategies of buyers 
and suppliers, strategic positioning and market power/control strategies of 
individual business. These changes in food and agricultural markets have 
introduced different forms of vertical integration and alliances, which are now 
increasingly dominating the agricultural market chain. The need for increased 
coordination can also be attributed to the failure of traditional (spot) agricultural 
markets to deal with this new scenario. Usually, bulk commodities flow through 
commodity markets to food processors that in turn market standardized products 
to consumers. Consumers now demand tailored foods and to ensure that they 





safety concerns have brought increased scrutiny and regulation in developed 
countries. As a result processors/marketers have avoided traditional spot 
markets and have engaged in more direct market channels such as market and 
production contracts, full ownership or vertical integration. 
 
In this context a fresh approach to market access, namely that of economic 
actors engaging in transactions rather than a large number of atomistic firms 
constituting a ‘market’ is imperative to gaining an understanding of market 
access for small-scale farmers in developing countries. It is often only the well-
endowed and skilled that have the ability to be part of these marketing chains 
and alliances. There is therefore a danger that the requirements, quality 
standards, and food safety rules of the consumers and corporations 
(supermarkets) in the developed countries, can act as effective barriers to 
participation in the high value chains by small exporters and to some extent, 
small producers. Or as Boehlje and Doering (2000: 53) argues – smaller 
operations not associated with an industrialized system will have increasing 
difficulty gaining the economies of size and the access to technology required to 
be competitive. For a small number of farmers in developing countries who have 
the ability and luxury to be part of these lucrative markets, however, the reward 
could be substantial.  





While there are serious concerns about their ability to survive in the medium term 
under these changing circumstances, there are options for smaller firms and 
farms to still play a role. This role could relate to product differentiation linked to 
products from region of origin, or organic products and other niche markets. The 
major route for continued survival will however be through exploiting other 
factors. One such a factor is a reliance on external rather than internal 
economies of scale through vertical integration, networking/clustering, and other 
forms of coordination and alliances. This could be amongst small firms, through 
establishing links or contracts between small firms/growers and larger 
enterprises that have already overcome the major barriers to market entry, or by 
acting as ancillary units of bigger export corporations.  It is in this context that the 
NIE can inform agribusiness and policy makers on the most appropriate 
organizational form. 
 
Against the background of deregulation and as the vertical coordinating 
characteristics of global agricultural industrialization increases, there is a need for 
more specific analytical techniques for contract evaluation using the transaction 
cost economics paradigm (Cook and Chaddad, 2000). This would require the 
examination of alternative “institutional arrangements” which could minimize 
transaction costs. 





2.2  Transaction Cost Economics in Agricultural Policy Research 
 
Transaction cost economics is especially relevant for agricultural market analysis 
in developing countries and the changes in the agricultural sector in general. As 
the agricultural sector becomes a more globalized and deregulated industry, the 
transaction becomes the unit of analysis. This implies that transaction costs 
economics can potentially offer useful insights to agricultural policy research in 
these countries. In the context of the greater need for coordination, the role of 
transaction costs, trust and relationships, formal and informal contracts, vertical 
linkages, information asymmetries, and strategic alliances will become very 
important. Especially important will be to analyze the institutional response at the 
farm level to this globalization. How can we include small farmers in export 
markets? Here we need to understand the role of contracts and how they 
emerge. The transaction costs framework can contribute in explaining the choice 
of contracts among farmers and traders, and local traders and multinationals.  
 
The transaction cost economics approach, focuses on how the characteristics of 
a transaction affect the costs of handling it through markets, bureaucracies, and 
other forms of organization. Williamson identifies the critical dimensions of 
characterizing a transaction and links these to the institutional governance 





uncertainty, frequency of exchange, and the degree to which investment are 
transaction-specific. Transaction costs include the costs of gathering and 
processing the information needed to carry out a transaction, of reaching 
decisions, of negotiating contracts, and of policing and enforcing those contracts. 
All transaction costs derive from a combination of bounded rationality (which 
reflects both imperfect information and a limited capacity to analyze it) and 
opportunism, which Williamson (1996) defines as  “self-interest seeking with 
guile." Given imperfect information about the future, all contracts are necessarily 
incomplete. If people were never opportunistic, however, incomplete contracts 
would not lead to contract enforcement problems; contracts would simply state 
that if unforeseen contingencies arose, the parties would act in a manner 
acceptable to all. 
 
There have been a number of fairly recent applications of transactions cost 
economics in different fields of the food and agricultural sector. Examples of 
these studies are Staal et. al. (1997), Frank and Henderson (1992), Key, 
Sadoulet and de Janvry (2000), Hobbs (1997), and Loader (1997). Very few 
empirical studies have actually measured transaction costs to-date, probably due 
to the difficulties associated with their measurement.  Transaction costs may be 
so high relative to the benefits of the transaction that the exchange does not 





The available studies have tended to focus on distance to market as a single 
indicator of transaction costs (Omamo, 1998; Oruko, 1999).  One of the first 
studies to carry out empirical measurement of transaction costs was the 
innovative approach by Hobbs (1997).   
 
2.3    Examples of Agricultural Policy Issues that can be analyzed using the NIE 
 
Contract Farming and other vertical linkages  
   
The increased need for vertical coordination and supply chain management 
create a potential new role for contract farming as a way to link small farmers to 
high-value markets in the wake of market liberalization in developing countries. 
Due to the requirements of the new agriculture, food-marketing firms prefer to 
engage in marketing and production contracts with farmers in developed as well 
as developing countries to ensure greater coordination of quantity and quality of 
supply.  
 
Production contracts can vary quite a bit, but in essence under contract farming, 
a trader contracts with a farmer to buy a specific quantity and quality of produce 
at a designated price. The price may be fixed at planting time or determined by 





technological information and extension services provided by traders. In some 
cases, traders also provide inputs on credit. Contract farming reduces both 
production and marketing risk by ensuring a guaranteed source of supply with 
specific quality requirements to processors or intermediaries and ensuring 
farmers an immediate market outlet for their produce (as well as access to 
inputs).  This type of contract is common for cash crops such as cotton and 
coffee, processed and canned vegetables, and highly perishable commodities 
such as fresh vegetables and dairy.  Kenya, Ethiopia, Mexico, Mozambique, 
Peru, etc.  have had experiences in contract farming for crops such as coffee, 
tea, French beans, Asian vegetables, milk, cotton, asparagus, tomatoes, etc.   
 
Contract farming, on the other hand, cannot be considered a panacea for 
integrating small farmers to high-value globalized markets. Contract farming 
schemes have been plagued by many problems in the past, such as inability to 
enforce contract with farmers, unequal bargaining power between producers and 
traders, and monopsonistic trader behavior. The danger with some contract 
farming schemes also is that it displaces decision-making authority from the 
farmer to the downstream processor or distributor turning the farmers into quasi-
employees. Other problems with contract farming relate to the high per unit costs 
of contracting with small-scale farmers. In addition, it is perceived that these 





requirements and therefore agribusinesses favour contracts with medium to large 
scale farmers (Key and Runsten, 1999). These factors could contribute to the 
danger that small holders might be excluded from contracting arrangements.   
 
The review of the literature on agricultural contracts in general, and contract 
farming in developing countries in particular, provides a good platform to assess 
the future of contract farming in developing countries. If we accept the premise 
that contract farming remains an important vehicle to keep small farmers involved 
in markets for high-value crops and animal products, it is now important to take 
the lessons from the experience with contract farming and use it to improve the 
working of this institution. With evolution and increasing prevalence of vertical 
coordination in agriculture the theoretical framework for evaluating these 
developments has also evolved. Several aspects in the New Institutional 
Economics such as contract theory, agency relationships (principle agent 
problems; incomplete contracts), transactions costs and the boundaries of the 
firms have now become key focus areas (Barry e.t al., 1992). This theoretical 
framework is useful in analyzing the relationships between the farmer (agent) 
and the vertical coordinator/integrator/agribusiness (the principal), where 
decisions about the extent of vertical coordination and related contract 
specifications can influence the financial position and performance of both the 





used to analyze and address the problems that could typically constrain or lead 
to the break down of contractual relations in developing country agriculture.    
 
Cooperatives and other Farmer Organizations 
 
Cooperatives and farmer organizations are institutional arrangements, the 
importance of which has re-emerged recently to organize small farmers in 
developing countries in the wake of agricultural market liberalization.  The 
advantages of organizing farmers into groups include, among other factors, a 
reduction in the transaction costs of accessing input and output markets, as well 
as improving the negotiating power of smaller farmers vis-à-vis large buyers or 
sellers.  The history of traditional cooperatives, on the other hand, suggests that 
cooperatives have not always been successful at serving the needs of its 
members.  One major problem with the traditional cooperatives in developing 
countries was that members never had a major financial stake in the cooperative; 
cooperatives were supported by governments.  Furthermore, cooperatives 
suffered from various organizational problems and a lack of clearly defined 
property rights assignments resulting in opportunistic behavior (such as free-
riding, moral hazard, agency problems, etc.), bureaucratic inefficiencies, and 





As a result, the popularity of the traditional cooperatives waned in the few 
decades preceding the 1990s. 
  
The NIE (including especially the literature on property rights and collective 
action, transaction costs, and the organizational/contracting  theories of  
Williamson, Grossman, Hart and Moore) can inform the design of such 
organizations and cooperatives to prevent their failure.  Examples of research 
conducted in the area of agricultural cooperatives include Cook and Iliopoulos 
(2000) for the United States and Staal et al. (1997) covering dairy cooperatives in 
Kenya and Ethiopia.  There is now a renewed interest in a new type or “new 
generation cooperative” that addresses the weaknesses of the traditional 
cooperatives by strengthening the assignments of property rights to its individual 
members and reducing the incentives for opportunistic behavior (Cook and 
Iliopoulos, 2000).   
 
Grades and Standards 
 
As mentioned earlier, the globalized agricultural sector is witnessing an 
increasing demand for safe, healthy, and high-quality food.  This trend results in 
more stringent and complicated international grades and standards.  Grades and 





and quality assurance about a product, thereby reducing information and 
transaction costs and facilitating international trade. However, grades and 
standards can also be used as  non-tariff barriers to trade if importing countries 
impose minimum standards that many developing countries cannot meet. For 
example, many supermarkets in Europe have strict regulations regarding 
pesticide residue on fruits and vegetables (formally known as Minimum Residue 
Levels (MRLs)).  These regulations imposed by supermarkets to meet consumer 
demand and create market niches, are trickling down to the production level and 
thereby affect the structure and characteristics of the market downstream.  
 
One can think of grades and standards as the “rules of the game” or as 
institutions that govern exchange in international markets. Therefore, the use of 
the transaction cost literature to address the issues revolving around grades and 
standards would be extremely useful. The policy questions that can be 
addressed under this framework include the following: How can developing 
countries respond to the increasing demand for international grades and 
standards? Do grades and standards act as barrier to trade particularly for small 
farmers and firms or do they create a market opportunity to enter high-value 
produce markets?  What are the private and public sectors’ capacity in 





national strategy to improve export sales? Some of these issues have been 
partially discussed in Reardon et. al. (2001).  
 
Traders’ Behavior and Performance  
 
In most developing countries, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, laws regarding 
market contracts and property rights are either non-existent or poorly enforced. 
Consequently, most commodity transactions are based on personalized 
exchange, markets remain thin and cash-based, and economies of scale in 
marketing are not fully exploited. Because of high transaction costs in terms of 
screening for trust-worthy partners, obtaining information about prices or quality, 
and enforcing contracts, traders have resorted to dealing with a tight network of 
traders linked either through ethnic group or other social and family relationships. 
Traders with higher social capital are better able to enter more capital-intensive 
marketing activities such as wholesaling and long-distance transport, whereas 
traders with poor social networks face high barriers to entry into the more 
lucrative market segments. Better connected traders also seem to have more 
sales and higher gross profits.  
 
The transaction costs and social capital literature can help us understand 





traders efficient, or can they be improved? What is the role of the government in 
cutting down on transaction costs and decreasing the riskiness of market 
exchange? What institutions are needed to foster the development of non-
personalized and more efficient market exchange? The studies by Fafchamps 
and Minten (1998a, 1998b, 2001) and Gabre-Madhin (2001) analyze some of 
these issues in the African grain trade context.  
 
Access to Agricultural Input and Rural Credit Markets 
 
In many developing countries, the withdrawal of parastatals from the provision of 
subsidized input and credit to small farmers has not been replaced by the private 
sector. Because of high transaction costs (including information costs), inability to 
enforce contract with farmers, and thin markets,  private traders are unwilling to 
provide input credit to farmers. As a result, there is a market failure in the 
provision of credit to rural households and farmers are unable to finance the 
purchase of agricultural inputs such as modern seeds and fertilizers. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, the average fertilizer application rate is 9 kg of nutrient per ha, 
one of the lowest levels in the world, resulting in a decline in soil fertility and rapid 
soil degradation in many areas.  





The literature on the economics of information and agency theory would be 
useful here to identify the types of institutions that would be successful in 
providing credit to rural households. Some of these older institutions 
(sharecropping, interlocked contracts, etc.) have been analyzed by Bhardan 
(1989) and Dorward et. al. (1998). However, more needs to be done in this area 
as the institutional fix for failing rural credit markets has yet to emerge. 
   
Institutions for Risk Management and Market Information    
 
In most developing countries, institutions for risk management and market 
information are missing.  Most farmers and traders rely on informal mechanisms 
and networks to cope with risk and obtain market information.  Price risk is 
becoming an increasingly important issue in light of public sector devolvement 
from price fixing policies and price stabilization schemes, and increased reliance 
on international trade.  Obtaining information on prices and market supply and 
demand is more important in an environment where prices fluctuate with local 
weather changes, seasonality of supply, world market conditions, and market 
performance.  In liberalized markets, instruments to cope with market risk are 
essential to increase the commercialization of agriculture.  Farmers and traders’ 
performance is as sensitive to price variability as to the absolute level of prices.   





Research on the types of institutions needed (either formal or informal) to 
manage market risk in developing countries is crucial to increase the 
commercialization of agriculture and encourage farmers and traders to 
participate in agricultural markets. This includes informal institutions such as 
contract farming, share-cropping, and other mechanisms that tie input and output 
markets, as well as formal institutions such as commodity exchanges and 
financial instruments such as options and futures contracts. It is important to find 
out under what conditions formal institutions can be created with the help of 
government policies or public and private investments to replace the informal, 
and perhaps less efficient, existing mechanisms to deal with market risk. The 
conditions would include the existence of a legal framework and technical know-
how that is necessary before more sophisticated market–based risk management 
mechanisms can be developed. It is also important to find out what type of 
market information systems would be most feasible and cost-effective in 
providing timely market information and price forecasting for market participants.  
Many market information systems developed through donor money in low-
income countries have been either non-sustainable or have not been effective at 
reaching the targeted stakeholders.  Therefore, more effort and research is 
needed to design more effective institutions that can reduce the transaction costs 
of providing information to rural households and help them cope with market risk. 





  Provision and Management of Rural Services 
 
Rural input services such as water for irrigation, electricity, feeder roads, and 
telecommunication networks have traditionally been public goods provided and 
financed by the government in developing countries. However, in many countries 
these services were lacking, rationed, or could only be provided at great costs 
due to inefficiencies and lack of transparency in public utilities.  The lack of 
accountability and transparency of government services in rural areas, and rising 
fiscal costs, have led to the increased decentralization and devolution of rural 
services to the concerned communities and user groups.  For that purpose, 
communities have been given the right and responsibility to raise their own funds 
and spend these funds according to pre-agreed upon rules and regulations.  For 
example, in many instances, institutions such as water user associations have 
been very helpful in devolving water management to the direct beneficiaries 
thereby raising efficiency and improving water resource allocation. The same 
could be applied in the maintenance of feeder roads in rural areas. The literature 
on the conditions and institutional priors needed for successful collective action 
would be very useful to determine which user groups are more likely to succeed 
in these types of schemes (see for example Meinzen-Dick, Raju and Gulati 
(2000) on the management of canal irrigation systems in India).  







This paper provided an overview of the NIE as a new burgeoning school of 
thought. With neoclassical economics increasingly being questioned in its ability 
to provide answers to the many economic problems and issues in low as well as 
high-income countries, the NIE provides an exciting and challenging new 
paradigm. The applications of NIE are well suited to the economic problems of 
world food and agricultural industry.  They could vary from studying the 
relationships in well-developed and highly sophisticated food supply chains to the 
informal institutions governing grades and standards in developing countries’ 
grain markets.  Although various elements of the NIE have already been applied 
in the context of food and agricultural policy in developing countries, this paper 
has showed the large potential for further very important applications in the area 
of agricultural market research.  
 
The NIE, however, is not without its limitations. To start with, economists are still 
very ignorant about institutions and how they emerge.  And as mentioned earlier, 
there is still no unified framework of analysis or theory that has emerged from this 
new paradigm.  Transaction cost economics as it stands is better at describing 
behavior and providing diagnosis than at predicting outcomes or prescribing 





The NIE is particularly poor in modeling risk and uncertainty related to prices or 
the environment.  These apparent weaknesses mean that the NIE faces many 
challenges ahead and much more work remains to be done. This is, however, 
what makes it an exciting and dynamic field with tremendous opportunities for 
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